Grundgesetze, as mentioned, was to be Frege’s magnum opus. It was to provide rigorous, gapless proofs that arithmetic was just logic further. Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, was intended to be his magnum opus, the book in which he would. iven the steadily rising interest in Frege’s work since the s, it is sur- prising that his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, the work he thought would be the crowning .

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AmazonGlobal Ship Orders Internationally. Some interpretations have been written about that time. It was to provide rigorous, gapless proofs that arithmetic was just logic further developed, that arithmetic was indeed entirely reducible to pure logic: Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Although Frege attempted to reduce the latter two kinds of entities truth-values and numbers to extensions, the fact is that the existence of concepts and extensions are derivable from his Rule of Substitution and Basic Law V, respectively.

These are essentially the definitions that logicians still use today. To explain this idea, Frege noted that one and the same external phenomenon can be counted in different ways; for example, a certain external phenomenon could be counted as 1 army, 5 divisions, 25 regiments, companies, platoons, or 24, people. It is an immediate consequence Theorem 5 and the fact that Predecessor is a functional relation that every number has a unique successor.

Logical Objects in Frege’s Grundgesetze, Section 10

And so on, for functions of more than two variables. His development of Frege’s philosophy of logic and mathematics through the analysis of his proofs and close examination of what Frege proves and what he does not, and cannot, prove is nothing short of thrilling.

The rule governing the first inference is a rule which applies only to subject terms whereas the rule governing the second grundgesetse governs reasoning within the predicate, and thus applies only to the transitive verb complements i. Bounded straight lines and planes enclosed by curves can certainly be intuited, but what is quantitative about them, what is common to lengths and surfaces, escapes our intuition. Blackwell, second grundgewetze edition, He presents Frege’s system and proofs in modern grundgesehze, so that anyone familiar with modern logic will be able to follow without the arduousness of learning Frege’s formalism.


Frege’s view is that our understanding can grasp them as objects if their definitions can be grounded in analytic propositions governing extensions of concepts. We use the following notation to denote the extension of this concept:. Professor Heck has worked on the philosophies of language, logic, mathematics, and mind, and is is one of the world’s foremost experts on the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. In addition, extensions can be rehabilitated in various ways, either axiomatically as in modern set theory which appears to be consistent or grungdesetze in various consistent reconstructions of Frege’s system.

If Schirn is correct, then we should be wary of taking ‘the concept F ‘ and ‘the extension of the concept F ‘ as co-referential and interchangeable.

The traditional view is that one must either restrict Basic Law V or restrict the Comprehension Principle for Concepts. Logic is not purely formal, from Frege’s point of view, but rather can provide substantive knowledge of objects and concepts. Frege made a point of showing how every step in a proof of a proposition was grundfesetze either in terms of one of the axioms or in terms of one of the rules grundyesetze inference or justified by a theorem or derived rule that had already been proved.

LeibnizBernard Bolzano [12]. There are four special functional expressions which are used in Frege’s system to express complex and general statements:. Frege realized that though we may identify this sequence of numbers with the natural numbers, such a sequence is simply a list: The exciting material hides in part II of Grundgesetze, as Heck uncovers for his readers. One of the axioms that Frege later added to his system, in the attempt to derive significant parts of mathematics from logic, proved to be inconsistent.

And I’d like to thank Paul Oppenheimer for making some suggestions that improved the diction and clarity in a couple of sentences, and for a suggestion for improvement to Section 3. After that, however, we have only fragments of philosophical works. Its detailed analysis and precision should serve as a model for Frege scholarship and indeed any scholarship.

We now work toward a theoretical description of the denotation of the grunegesetze as a whole. In a famous episode, Bertrand Russell wrote to Frege, just as Vol.

Indeed, this axiom can be made even more general. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. Here we can see the beginning of two lifelong interests of Frege, namely, 1 in grundgrsetze concepts and definitions developed for one domain fare when applied in a wider domain, and 2 in the contrast between legitimate appeals to intuition in geometry and illegitimate appeals to intuition in grundgesetzd development of pure number theory.


Philosophers today still find that work insightful.

But this is nonsense: Mathematical theories such as set theory seem to require some non-logical concepts such as set membership which cannot be defined in terms of logical concepts, at least when axiomatized by certain powerful non-logical axioms such as the proper axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

Frege also held that propositions had a referential relationship with their truth-value in grumdgesetze words, a statement “refers” to the truth-value it takes. Chapter 9 looks at Frege’s proof that every subset of a countable set is countable and shows that Frege proves, as a lemma, a generalized version of the least number principle.

It is one which evolves out of the ideas that 1 certain concepts and laws remain invariant under permutations of the domain of quantification, and 2 that logic ought not to dictate the size grundggesetze the domain of quantification. Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPaperswith links to its database.

Gottlob Frege (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Thus, Frege analyzed the above inferences in the following general way: Frege called the course-of-values of a concept F its extension. Showing of 2 reviews. Note the last row of the table — when Frege wants to assert that two conditions are materially equivalent, he uses the identity sign, since this says that they denote the same truth-value. Recently, Boolosdeveloped one of the more interesting suggestions for revising Basic Law V without abandoning second-order logic and its comprehension principle for concepts.

It would also have served as the best argument Frege had for the claim that Basic Law V is a logical truth, or so Heck argues. Frege would say that any object that a concept maps to The True falls under the concept. The reader is encouraged to complete the proof as an exercise. But we sometimes also cite to his book of and his book of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetikreferring to these works as Begr and Glrespectively.